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1 Introduction 
Two decades of Norwegian climate policy illustrate that while policy ambitions tend to be 
high, policy adoption and implementation capacity tend to be low. In 1989, the Norwegian 
Parliament adopted a decision to stabilise Norway’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at 1990 
levels by 2000. Since then, emissions reduction targets have been strengthened. Nevertheless, 
20 years hence, Norwegian GHG emissions in 2008 had increased by more than 8 per cent 
since 1990 (SSB 2009) and Norway still has not succeeded in adopting adequate policy 
measures to actually implement the 20-year old stabilisation goal. 
 
In 1990, GHG emissions from the mainland and petroleum industries together accounted for 
more than 50% of Norwegian GHG emissions. Since 1990, emissions from energy-intensive 
industries have decreased even if these industries largely have been exempted from GHG 
regulations. Similarly, emissions from the petroleum sector have increased in this period, 
even if the petroleum sector is the sector that is most heavily taxed by the CO2 tax adopted in 
1991. Even if climate policy measures may have contributed to reduce the growth in 
Norwegian GHG emissions, the emissions profile of these sectors since 1990 may be 
interpreted to indicate that the climate policy instruments that actually have been 
implemented are fiscal rather than environmental in nature and have had little impact on 
Norwegian GHG emissions. 
 
The focus of this paper is the Norwegian climate policy debate since the early 1990s. I 
provide an empirical account of the policy process that has taken place since the CO2 tax was 
introduced in 1990 until the Norwegian parliament adopted the EU ETS directive in 2007. 
This narrative is supplemented with an account of the actions and strategies of the energy-
intensive and petroleum industries to influence the decision-making process. 
 
In section 2 I give a brief overview of the organisational features of the two target groups. 
Section 3 focuses on the debate associated with the introduction of the CO2 tax, while section 
4 focuses on the decision-making process associated with the introduction of emissions 
trading in Norway. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 The energy intensive and petroleum industries: 
Organisational features 
In the 1990s the process industry was organised in the Federation of Norwegian Process 
Industries (PIL). PIL was established in 1992 after the metallurgical industry association 
merged with other energy-intensive industry associations (Espeli, 1999: 193). PIL organised 
about 700 companies from 14 industries with 14.000 employees, and represented a wide 
range of energy intensive industries including mining, pharmaceuticals, glass and ceramics, 
recycling, chemicals, metallurgy, downstream petroleum, plastics, cement, and wood 
processing. PIL was an important actor with contacts in the major political parties of Norway 
(Kasa and Malvik 2000). In 2006 PIL and the Federation of Norwegian Manufacturing 
Industries (TBL) established The Federation of Norwegian Industries (Norwegian Industries). 
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Norwegian Industries represents 2.000 companies with 110.000 employees (Norwegian 
Industries 2009a).  
The petroleum industry has been organised in the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) 
since 1989. OLF organises oil and supplier companies engaged in exploration and production 
of oil and gas on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (OLF 2009a). OLF represents 47 oil and 
gas companies and 58 supplier companies with 29.000 employees (OLF 2009b). 
OLF and Norwegian Industries are both members of the Confederation of Norwegian 
Business and Industry (NHO). NHO is the largest business association in Norway. The 
organisation is engaged in a broad set of policy issues, including climate policy. NHO is 
member of the European umbrella organisation Business Europe. Norwegian Industries 
comprises approximately 25 per cent of NHO and is by far the largest sectoral federation 
within NHO (Norwegian Industries 2009a).  
3 The political battle over the CO2-tax 
The CO2-tax has been the main policy instrument in Norwegian climate policy since the 
beginning of the 1990s. In 2007, the CO2-tax covered 52 per cent of Norway’s total 
greenhouse gas emissions, and 68 per cent of Norway’s total CO2-emissions (Ministry of the 
Environment 2007: 47)1
 
. Hence, one third of Norway’s total CO2-emissions were exempted 
from the CO2-tax.  
Table 1 CO2-tax rates for 2007 
   NOK per l/Sm3/kg NOK per tonne CO2 
Petrol 0,80 345 
Mineral oil 0,54  
– light oil, diesel  203 
– heavy oil  172 
Mineral oil, reduced rate 0,28  
– light oil, diesel  105 
– heavy oil  89 
Inland/onshore use of gas   
– natural gas 0,47 201 
– LPG 0,60 200 
Continental shelf 0,80  
– light oil, diesel  300 
– heavy oil  255 
– natural gas  342 
Source: Ministry of the Environment 2007: 47. 
                                                     
1 - St.meld. nr. 34 (2006-2007) 
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The CO2-tax is, however, varying greatly. Table 1 shows that the petroleum industry paid 
between NOK 255 and NOK 342 per tonne CO2 on emissions from the continental shelf in 
2007. Also emissions from petrol are highly taxed, while emissions from inland use of gas are 
taxed by NOK 200 per tonne CO2. In contrast, producers of aluminium, cement, lime, glass, 
ceramics, iron and steel (energy intensive industries) pay less than NOK 10 per tonne CO2-
equivalents in 2006 (SSB 2009).   
     
 
3.1 The CO2-tax is introduced  
In 1990 the Syse Government, a centre-right minority coalition consisting of the Conservative 
Party,  the Norwegian Christian Democratic Party and the Centre Party, proposed a CO2-tax 
covering mineral oil and gasoline (Kasa 2000: 107). The same year the Brundtland 
Government, a one-party minority government established by the Labour Party, proposed to 
extend the CO2-tax to also cover CO2-emissions from coal, petrol and petroleum production 
on the Norwegian continental shelf (Ministry of Finance 1990).2
 
  
Table 2a Party representation in the Norwegian parliament 1989-2009. The 
number of mandates in Parliament. 
 
Party 1989-1993 1993-1997 1997-2001 2001-2005 2005-2009 
The Progress Party 
(FrP) 21 6 20 24 38 
The Conservatives 
(H) 37 28 22 38 23 
Labour 
(Ap) 62 67 65 43 61 
Centre Party 
(Sp) 11 31 11 10 11 
The Norwegian 
Christian Democratic 
Party 
(KrF) 14 13 25 22 11 
The Liberal Party 
(V)  1 6 2 10 
Socialist Left Party 
(SV) 18 13 9 23 15 
Others 2 6 7 3  
      
 165 165 165 165 169 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 Ot.prp. nr. 17 (1990-1991) 
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Table 2b Norwegian governments from 1989-2009. The number of mandates in 
Parliament. 
Governments 1989-1993 1993-1997 1997-2001 2001-2005 2005-2009 
Syse  
1989-1990 
H, KrF, Sp 
62     
Brundtland 
1990-1996 
Ap 
62 67    
Jagland 
1996-1997 
Ap 
 67    
Bondevik I 
1997-2000 
KrF, Sp, V 
  42   
Stoltenberg I 
2000-2001 
Ap 
  65   
Bondevik II 
2001-2005 
H, KrF, V 
   62  
Stoltenberg II 
2005-2009 
Ap, Sp, SV 
    87 
 
The energy intensive industries opposed the proposal and argued that a CO2-tax would lead 
to a significant loss of jobs without having any environmental effect at all (Nilsen 2000: 108). 
Their argument was heard, and this industry was exempted from the tax that was adopted in 
1990 and implemented in 1991 (Bang 2004; Kasa and Malvik 2000; Nilsen 2001). The 
exemption was given in spite of the fact that the energy intensive and export oriented 
industries in Norway were responsible for 40 per cent of the CO2 emissions at the time the 
tax was introduced (Alfsen 1999). These industries’ membership in policy networks that 
included key government bodies contributes to explain their influence in this case (Kasa 
2000; Kasa and Malvik).   
 
In contrast, the petroleum industry did not succeed in preventing the imposition of the CO2-
tax in 1990. It is a common view that this failure was due to lack of lobbying in the early 
phase of the policy making process (Bang 2004; Kasa and Malvik 2000; Nilsen 2000; Reitan 
1998). However, OLF was founded in 1989 and has been a very active participant in climate 
politics since its establishment. Moreover, the petroleum industry was part of another 
important policy network that included key governmental bodies such as the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy and the Ministry of Trade and Industry.  
Since 1990, there have been several attempts to extend the CO2-tax to sectors not covered by 
the initial tax.  
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3.2 The Green Tax Commission 1996  
In 1996 the Green Tax Commission was about to propose a CO2-tax on emissions from the 
energy intensive industries (Kasa 2000; Kasa and Malvik 2000).  
 
However, when the NHO representative in the Commission realised that the majority of the 
Commission’s members supported an extension of the CO2-tax, she leaked the proposal to 
the media (Kasa and Malvik 2000). The proposal was stopped before it was submitted. Later 
it turned out that Gro Harlem Brundtland, the Prime Minister representing Labour, had 
instructed the members of the Commission representing Ministry of Finance and Ministry of 
the Environment to vote against a CO2-tax on emissions from the energy intensive industries 
(Kasa 2000).  
 
Compared to the proposed CO2-tax for other sectors, energy intensive industries were offered 
a reduced tax rate of NOK50 per tonne CO2. Nevertheless, the energy intensive industries 
strongly opposed the proposal and once again PIL succeeded in avoiding the tax. In this 
decision, PIL and NHO demonstrated that they had attentive contacts at the very highest 
political level.   
 
3.3  The 1998 Bondevik I-proposal: CO2-tax on energy intensive 
industry 
The report of the Green Tax Commission was submitted to the Ministry of Finance in June 
1996, and was followed up by a governmental white paper two years later. In April 1998, the 
Bondevik I Government, a minority coalition consisting of the Norwegian Christian 
Democratic Party, the Centre Party and the Liberal Party, proposed to extend the CO2-tax  by 
including the energy intensive industries in the CO2-tax regime (Ministry of Finance 1998).3
 
 
While the Green Tax Commission proposed a CO2-tax on emissions from energy-intensive 
industries at NOK 50 per tonne CO2, the Bondevik I government proposed a somewhat 
higher tax at NOK 100 per tonne CO2. Since the Green Tax Commission’s proposal Norway 
had signed the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), adopted at the third meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to 
the climate convention in Kyoto in 1997, and the Bondevik I Government argued that the tax 
proposed by the Green Tax Commission was too low to implement Norway’s international 
emissions reduction commitment (Ministry of Finance 1998). While the tax rate was 
increased, it was nevertheless lower than, for instance, the tax on petrol (NOK 365 in 1996), 
light mineral oil (NOK 160 in 1996) and off shore oil production (NOK 320 in 1996) . 
Moreover, the Bondevik I Government did not only propose a reduced tax, it also proposed to 
compensate the energy intensive industries until the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. The 
compensation covered taxes on emissions from coal used for processes in the metallurgical 
industries and was supposed to be gradually reduced from the year the Kyoto Protocol was 
ratified. The compensation arrangement was set to expire in 2010 (Ministry of Finance 1998).   
The proposal also included a CO2-tax on mineral oil products. Hence, the following new 
sectors were to be covered by the tax: aviation, national shipping of goods, fisheries, the 
supply fleet, pulp and paper and fish meal industries. The proposal also included a reduced 
                                                     
3 St.prp. nr. 54 (1997-1998). 
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CO2-tax on coal and coke in the sectors of cement and leca production and coal and coke for 
process purposes. Hence, the on-shore industries – including the energy intensive industries - 
were to be taxed. 
 
NHO, including OLF and PIL, participated in the formal hearing process prior to the 
introduction of the proposal. NHO and PIL were clearly against the proposed CO2-tax until 
an international climate change agreement was reached and other countries also introduced a 
CO2-tax. They emphasised that a unilateral CO2-tax would imply costs that in effect forced 
the industry to move their activity to countries without similar regulations. Thus, they argued, 
while a unilateral CO2-tax would have significant economic and societal effects, it would 
have no environmental effects. Given that the Bondevik I Government indeed proposed both 
a reduced tax rate and compensation for energy intensive industries, the industries succeeded 
in extracting regulatory concessions. Still, this was unacceptable to the energy intensive 
industry and when the proposal was introduced,  NHO and PIL launched a lobbying campaign 
directed at the Norwegian Parliament:  
While the energy intensive industries could no longer prevent the 
green tax issue from becoming a parliamentary issue, they still 
controlled important power resources that could be employed in the 
parliamentary contest. The industries launched a vigorous lobbying 
campaign against political parties and their Parliament members (Kasa 
2000: 114).  
 
In addition to NHO, PIL lobbied with local and regional branches of the trade union (Kasa 
2000: 114). They directed their lobbying activities at the three largest political parties in the 
Parliament; the Labour Party (largest), “the anti-tax right-wing Progress Party” (second 
largest) and the Conservative Party (third largest) (ibid.).   
 
PIL’s counter-proposal to the CO2-tax was the establishment of a Norwegian emissions 
trading scheme with free emissions allowances to the energy intensive industries.   
This implicit subsidy had several advantages for the emission-
intensive industry. A free or cheap quota for CO2-emissions would be 
more permanent than a direct subsidy to cover tax expenses, and it 
would not emerge as an explicit subsidy in public budgets. The costs 
would instead be carried permanently by other economic sectors, 
which would have to pay higher prices for their quotas (Kasa 2000: 
115).  
 
PIL’s proposal got support (Kasa 2000), and in June 1998 the Bondevik I proposal was 
rejected by a majority of the Norwegian Parliament (i.e., the Labour Party, the Conservative 
Party and the Progress Party). Instead the Parliament decided to appoint an expert committee 
on a national emissions trading scheme. The committee – “the Quota Commission” - was 
appointed in September 1998. With this outcome of the Bondevik I proposal, the energy 
intensive industries had avoided the CO2-tax yet again. 
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4 Towards a Norwegian emissions trading scheme 
The Kyoto protocol allows parties to make use of three ‘flexible mechanisms’: Joint 
implementation (JI); the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Emission Trading (ET). 
The aim is flexible and cost effective greenhouse gas emissions abatement. Emission trading 
establishes a price on emissions permits and allows countries to trade permits. Countries with 
abatement costs that are lower than the permit price become sellers in this market, whereas 
countries whose abatement costs are higher than the permit price become buyers.  
 
Bang et al. argue that the introduction of emissions trading in Norway was inspired by “pre-
Kyoto proposals originating in the US” (2007: 291). From 1995 to 1997, business 
organisations and the energy intensive industries advocated voluntary agreements as an 
alternative to the CO2-tax (Bang et al. 2007). However, with the adoption of the ‘flexible 
mechanisms’ incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol, they changed their strategy: Now they were 
advocating emissions trading as an alternative to the CO2-tax. In contrast to a tax scheme, 
emissions trading “allowed them to substitute expensive domestic mitigation measures with 
cheaper emissions reductions abroad” (Bang 2004: 210). But, as discussed above, the energy 
intensive industries also advocated a domestic emissions trading scheme as a counter-proposal 
to the CO-tax (Kasa 2000; Kasa and Malvik 2000).  
 
Jens Stoltenberg, the leader of the Standing Committee on Energy and Environment in the 
Norwegian Parliament in 1998 and also a deputy leader of the Labour Party, was among the 
initiators of the emissions trading proposal (Dagens Næringsliv 1998). Stoltenberg had, as 
former state secretary of the Ministry of the Environment, already in the early 1990s 
advocated an emissions trading scheme. So, whether PIL in 1998 supported Stoltenberg’s 
proposal from the early 1990s, or whether Stoltenberg and the Labour Party supported PIL’s 
proposal is unclear.  
 
4.1 The proposal of The Quota Commission  
The Quota Commission submitted its proposal for a national emissions trading scheme in 
December 1999 (NOU 2000:1a). The mandate of the Commission included the following 
conditions: The emissions trading scheme should at least cover the sectors not covered by the 
CO2-tax. This included the energy intensive industries. The sectors covered by the emissions 
trading scheme should reduce their emissions by approximately 30 per cent compared to 1990 
levels. The Commissions was also mandated to assess a system where 70 per cent of the 
emissions permits were allocated for free, while 30 per cent of the permits were auctioned.  
 
Four aspects of the emissions trading scheme were thus important: First, how much of the 
Norwegian greenhouse gas emissions that were to be covered by the emissions trading 
scheme. Second, the emissions reduction targets for the sectors covered by the scheme. Third, 
the method of allocation of emissions allowances. Fourth, when emissions trading should 
commence, particularly whether the emissions trading scheme should be launched in 2008 or 
earlier.  
 
The Commission recommended that an emission trading scheme should be as broad as 
possible and proposed that the scheme should cover 90 per cent of Norway’s total greenhouse 
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gas emissions. However, the commission submitted a divided position on the allocation 
method. All the members agreed that “in principle the quotas should be sold”, but the 
members were split on the allocation method in practice. The majority argued that all sectors 
covered by the system should “pay full market price for emission quotas in line with the 
polluter pays principle. Free quotas should not be allocated to any industrial sector. The 
majority believes that the benefits achieved by allocating free quotas are disproportionately 
small in relation to the increased costs which would be imposed on the rest of the economy” 
(NOU 2000:1b). In contrast a majority consisting of two members (among them a 
representative for the oil company Statoil) were “of the opinion that free quotas represent a 
necessary flexibility as a temporary measure until other countries introduce similar emission 
costs.” (NOU 2000:1b). Hence, they focused on the “level playing ground” argument also 
emphasised by business organisations in the EU. Another minority, consisting of three 
representatives for the ministries, defined this question as a political one which they delegated 
to the politicians (NOU 2000:1b).  
 
A number of public and non-public actors participated in the preceding hearing process. Both 
NHO, OLF and PIL attended hearings, and they had coordinated their positions. The three 
business and industry organisations all supported an emission trading scheme – and a broadest 
possible one. However, they did not support The Quota Commission on the question of 
allocation method. They opposed “unilateral auctioning of all Norwegian permits” (NOU 
2000:1a).4
With regard to timing, moreover, NHO opposed emissions trading before 2008 when the first 
Kyoto period would start. It argued that a national emissions trading scheme before 2008 
would not be in line with the principle of a level playing field.  
  
 
 
OLF also advocated emissions trading – nationally as well as internationally (NOU 2000:1). 
OLF accepted that the petroleum industry would have to pay for emissions allowances on the 
condition that emissions trading would replace the CO2-tax (ibid). The emissions allowances 
were expected to be less costly than the CO2-tax paid by the petroleum industry.  
 
4.2 The Stoltenberg I Government’s white paper in 2001 
The Quota Commission’s recommendations were largely followed up by the Stoltenberg I 
Government in June 2001 (Ministry of the Environment 2001).5
 
 This was a one-party 
minority government established by the Labour Party.  
With regard to coverage, the Stoltenberg I Government proposed a Norwegian ETS covering 
80 per cent of the emissions from 2008. The emissions were to be reduced by 30 percent 
compared to emissions in 1990 by 2012. The basic principle for allocation of permits should 
be auctioning, but the Stoltenberg I Government also proposed to allocate some free 
emissions allowances based on historical emissions. According to the proposal, the sectors 
already covered by the CO2-tax were to continue to pay the CO2-tax in the pre-Kyoto period 
(before emissions trading commenced). The government would initiate negotiations on 
voluntary agreements with the sectors not covered by the CO2-tax, in practice the energy 
                                                     
4 Author’s translation. 
5 St.meld. nr. 54 (2000-2001). 
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intensive industries. According to Bang et al. (2004: 291), this proposal was “the result of 
fierce lobbying on the part of industry”. 
 
NHO advocated voluntary emissions trading in the pre-Kyoto period. More specifically, NHO 
proposed that sectors covered by the CO2-tax should be allowed to choose whether they 
would continue to pay this tax, or join a voluntary emissions trading scheme. This proposal 
was in line with the view of the petroleum industry – which paid a more than NOK 300 per 
tonne CO2, and hence, would benefit greatly from an emissions trading scheme where the 
emissions allowances were expected to be far less expensive than the CO2-tax. 
 
At the same time there was a growing debate about a European Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS). The Stoltenberg I Government referred to the EU Commission’s consultative 
Green Paper on Emissions Trading from March 2000, and signalised interest in cooperating 
with the EU and the Nordic countries on emissions trading (Ministry of the Environment 
2001: 13).  
 
In 2003, the EU Commission’s Green Paper on Emissions Trading was followed up by 
Directive 2003/87/EC in which a scheme for greenhouse gas emissions trading within the EU 
was established. The EU ETS became the cornerstone of EU’s efforts to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions. According to Markussen and Svendsen (2005) four main issues 
were discussed before the EU ETS was adopted: 1) Target groups, i.e., the sectors to be 
covered by the scheme, 2) allocation method: auctioning versus free emissions allowances 
based on historical emissions, 3) mix with other instruments: while emissions trading was 
considered as domestic action in the EU, project-based emissions reductions and links to 
other emissions trading systems were treated as use of the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol, and hence, as supplementary to domestic action, and 4) compliance: mainly focused 
on the penalty size in the case of non-compliance. Christiansen and Wettestad argue that the 
question of mandatory or voluntary participation in the first trading period from 2005-2007 
was the most contentious issue (2003:13). 
 
4.3 The Bondevik II Government’s white paper in 2002 
After the 2001 election, a new centre-right minority coalition government was established. 
The Bondevik II Government consisted of the Christian Democratic Party, the Liberal Party 
and the Conservative Party. This government presented a supplementary report to the 
Stoltenberg I Government’s white paper to the Norwegian Parliament in March 2002 
(Ministry of the Environment 2002a).6
 
 The white paper mainly supported the Stoltenberg I 
position, with one important exception: The pre-Kyoto period.  
In contrast to the Stoltenberg I proposal, the Bondevik II Government proposed a national 
emissions trading scheme from 2005 to 2007 for the sectors not covered by the CO2-tax. This 
preliminary emission trading scheme was an alternative to the voluntary approach proposed 
by the Stoltenberg I Government (Ministry of the Environment 2002a: 4).  
 
                                                     
6 St.meld. nr. 14 (2001-2002). 
CICERO Working Paper 2009:04 
 Taxing greenhouse gas emission: The case of the energy intensive industries and the petroleum 
industry in Norway 
 
 
 
 
10 
According to the Bondevik II proposal, the sectors covered by the emissions trading scheme 
were to reduce their emissions by 20 per cent compared to 1990 levels by 2012. The 
emissions allowances were to be allocated for free based on historical emissions.  
 
At this time the EU was preparing an emissions trading scheme to take effect from 2005. 
However, the Bondevik II Government did not want to wait for the EU emissions trading 
scheme, and proposed instead a Norwegian ETS. This Norwegian ETS would be adapted to 
the Norwegian emissions profile and policy measures (i.e., the Norwegian CO2-tax). Hence, 
the Norwegian ETS would cover sectors that, until then, had not been regulated, and would 
not cover emissions from the continental shelf and the transport sector, which were regulated 
though the CO2 tax.  
 
However, the white paper stated that the government would actively seek to influence the EU 
decision-making process, and Børge Brende, the Minister of the Environment, was lobbying 
in Brussels in 2002. Brende emphasised first, the importance of having the possibility to 
include more sectors than the EU proposal included, and second, the possibility of auctioning 
the allowances. Covering 1/3 of the total greenhouse gas emissions in the EU, and only 20-30 
per cent of the total Norwegian emissions, the EU proposal was weaker than the Bondevik II 
proposal. The EU planned to allocate emissions allowances for free in the first phase of the 
EU ETS from 2005 to 2007 (Ministry of the Environment 2002b).  
 
PIL opposed the Bondevik I proposal to introduce an emissions trading scheme from 2005 to 
2007. PIL would rather negotiate a new voluntary agreement, in line with the Stoltenberg I 
proposal from 2001. PIL argued that its members had already reduced their emissions 
considerably compared to 1990. For example, in 2002 the aluminium industry had reduced its 
emissions by 50 per cent, which was well beyond the 30 per cent reduction target suggested 
by the Parliament in their mandate for the Quota Commission. Moreover, PIL argued that the 
emissions trading scheme would be more expensive and bureaucratic than a voluntary 
agreement (Aftenposten 2002). 
 
 
4.4  Bondevik II’s legislative proposal in 2004 
In March 2004, Børge Brende, the environment minister, announced that the Ministry had 
adopted a voluntary agreement with PIL. Energy intensive industries not included in the 
Norwegian ETS were to reduce their emissions voluntarily instead of being included in the 
pre-Kyoto Norwegian ETS. The decision implied that Norway would adapt its emissions 
trading scheme to the EU ETS, which covered electricity (and heat) production, iron and 
steel, oil and gas, building materials (cement, glass, ceramics and bricks) and pulp and paper. 
 
Although the Bondevik II Government had hoped to include more sectors in the Norwegian 
ETS, the legislative proposal was adjusted to the EU ETS which was adopted by the EU in 
2003. Hence, the Norwegian ETS from 2005 to 2007 included only 10 per cent of the total 
Norwegian greenhouse gas emissions, while the Norwegian ETS from 2008 to 2012 included 
about 27 per cent of the total emissions.  
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In December 2004 the Norwegian Parliament passed a law based on a legislative proposal 
from the Ministry of the Environment establishing a national emission trading scheme for the 
periods 2005 to 2007 and 2008 to 2012 (Ministry of the Environment 2004).7
 
  
OLF was particularly concerned with the possibility of voluntary participation in the 
Norwegian ETS from 2005. Looking ahead, OLF also pointed to the principle that no 
emissions should be subjected to more than one policy instrument and argued that 
installations covered by the (Norwegian) ETS from 2008, should not also be subjected to the 
CO2-tax (OLF 2004). The organisation argued that all cost-effective emissions reductions 
were already implemented in the off-shore sector because of the high CO2-tax. Therefore, 
OLF preferred emissions trading and the clean development mechanism as the best 
instruments to achieve further emission reductions in the future (OLF 2004).   
 
In Parliament, a majority of the Standing Committee on Energy and the Environment, 
consisting of the Members of Parliament from the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, and 
the Christian Democratic Party, argued that the Government should negotiate a bilateral 
agreement with the EU to ensure compatibility between the Norwegian and the EU emissions 
trading systems (Standing Committee on Energy and the Environment 2004: 7).  
 
This “first edition” of the Norwegian ETS thus only covered 10-11 per cent of Norway’s total 
emissions. CO2 emissions from energy use, and in some cases process emissions, were 
included in the scheme. 51 installations were given permits. These installations were found in 
the following sectors: Combustion installations above 20 MW (all in all 36), including district 
heating using natural gas (8), gas based electricity plants (2), pulp and paper using natural gas 
(6), fish meal and fish oil using natural gas (7), petrochemical, including crackers (4), gas 
processing and terminals (4) and others (5). Moreover, the scheme included refineries (2), 
steel production (1), cement plants (2) and other production facilities based on minerals (10).  
 
The method of allocation was adjusted in accordance with the EU rules, which implied free 
allocation of emissions allowances based on historical emissions. The baseline used for 
permit allocation was 95 per cent of the average 1998-2001 emissions, unless the applicant 
could document changes in the nature and scope of its activities.  
 
4.5 Towards Norwegian participation in the EU emissions trading 
system  
In March 2006, the Stoltenberg II Government decided to accept incorporation of the EU 
Emissions Trading Directive in the EEA agreement (Ministry of the Environment 2006). The 
amendments to the Norwegian emissions-trading law to adapt it to the EU ETS were passed 
by Parliament in June 2007.  
 
                                                     
7 Ot.prp. nr. 13 (2004-2005), Innst. O. nr. 33 (2004-2005), beslutning. O. nr. 25 (2004-2005) Lov om 
kvoteplikt og handel med kvoter for utslipp av klimagasser (klimakvoteloven). All documents available 
online: http://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Saker/Sak/?p=30758 
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This change implied that offshore oil and gas and pulp and paper were included in the trading 
scheme from 2008, along with the sectors already covered in the period 2005-2007. Hence, 
from 2008 the emissions trading scheme covers about 40 per cent of Norwegian emissions of 
greenhouse gases. 
 
With regard to allocation method, the petroleum sector was not granted any free quotas. The 
onshore industry was granted 87 per cent of its permits for free, while emissions from 
industrial processes were granted 100 per cent free allocation. The allocation of free 
emissions allowances is based on emissions in the period from 1998 to 2001.  
 
Norwegian Industries was not only an advocate of a Norwegian emissions trading system, the 
organisation was also a proponent for Norwegian participation in the EU ETS, which 
constituted one of the conditions for the voluntary agreement that was negotiated in 2003-
2004 (Norsk Industri 2009b). Moreover, the energy intensive industries succeeded in getting 
free emissions allowances for emissions from industrial processes. However, in contrast to the 
industry’s position, the allocation of emissions allowances was based on historical emissions 
- the industry’s emissions from 1998 to 2001.    
 
In 2009, the Norwegian ETS was finally incorporated in the EU ETS. This was in accordance 
with the original position of NHO and PIL/Norwegian Industries. Also OLF has been an 
eager proponent of Norwegian participation in the EU ETS. In 2004 OLF, inter alia, argued 
that Norway should implement the EU ETS directive – not negotiate a special agreement 
(OLF 2004). While the oil industry succeeded in being included in the Norwegian ETS, it did 
not get any free emissions allowances and it has to pay the difference between the costs of the 
emissions allowances and the former CO2-tax.  
 
5  Conclusion 
Even if the Norwegian Parliament adopted a CO2 stabilisation target as early as 1989, 
Norwegian GHG emissions have continued to grow. In 2008, Norwegian GHG emissions 
were more than 8 per cent higher than in 1990 (SSB 2009) and Norway still lacks adequate 
policy measures to implement the 20-year old stabilisation goal. 
With a main focus on the decision-making processes associated with the introduction of the 
CO2 tax in 1990 and emissions trading in 2005, the paper provides an empirical account of 
major climate policy debates and decisions the last 20 years. Discussing the strategies the 
energy-intensive and petroleum industries have used to influence the decision-making 
process, the account shows that the energy-intensive industries have been very successful in 
their campaign against CO2 regulations for their sectors. Through the 1990s they were 
repeatedly exempted from taxation. After emissions trading surfaced on the climate policy 
agenda, the energy-intensive industries were exempted from the basic principle of auctioning 
of emissions permits and were granted their emissions permits for free. In contrast, the 
petroleum industry has paid a high CO2-tax since the early 1990s, and has even continued to 
pay this tax after the industry was included in an emissions trading scheme. Nevertheless, 
emissions from the energy-intensive industries have decreased by 27 per cent compared to 
1990, whereas GHG emissions from the petroleum industry have increased by 90 per cent 
during this period. In this sense, it seems reasonable to characterise Norwegian climate 
policies during the last couple of decades as policies of failed ambitions. 
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